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Abstract
In a Hotelling’s duopoly with a general transportation cost func-
tion, we study competition through catalog: each firm chooses at the
same time a price and a location. With simultaneous catalog offer,
there is no equilibrium in pure strategies for high valuations of the
consumers, while a Stackelberg equilibrium exists under mild condi-
tions. The follower is better off than the leader, whose price is smaller:
the location preemption effect is weaker than the price leadership ef-
fect. We obtain closed-form solutions for the linear and quadratic
costs cases. Using these results, we discuss the nature of competition
depending on the relative flexibility of products and prices.
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1 Introduction
On most markets, the product choice is less flexible than the price policy.
This explains why a reasonable modeling assumption is that price competi-
tion occurs only after the choice of products. But this is not always the case
for at least two reasons. A first reason is related to the nature of the product:
In some economic sectors, firms enjoy a large adaptability of their product.
Standardization of intermediary inputs makes production highly flexible.
For example, computer stores can change the characteristics of the comput-
ers they sell within one day. The service sector also usually exhibits extreme
adaptability: for instance, online travel agencies’ offers change virtually in
a continuous fashion, both with regards to price and products offered. As a
consequence, on such markets, the choice of product and the choice of price
are simultaneous. A second reason is related to price rigidity: some firms
appear as leaders (in time) concerning both product choice and prices, as
they do not revise their price offer when other competitors enter the mar-
ket. For example, each shop of a chain stores may face different independent
markets but the firm chooses the same type of product on all markets and
a unique pricing policy. Local competitors reacts to these offers while the
converse is obviously not true. Agency situations often explain this inertia:
an employee that work as a seller is not allowed to lower the price of the
product it sells but must stick to the announced price. The use of national
advertisement, too, partly explains the price stickiness of chains. In this pa-
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per we focus on these horizontally differentiated markets where competition
takes place through catalog, a product-price couple (rigid) announcement1.
In his pioneering paper, Hotelling’s main motivation was to construct a
model in which price competition does not take a ”winner-takes-all” form,
but in which small changes in price only affects smoothly the quantity sold by
a competitor. In his setting, the author shows that if firms choose first their
locations, their will be a tendency towards homogeneity of the product–the
so-called principle of minimum differentiation. It is somehow paradoxical
that the idea of ’stability’ in competition put forth by Hotelling is actu-
ally invalid in his model. Indeed, as pointed out by d’Aspremont et al.
(1979), a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist because a price equilib-
rium fails to exist when products are too similar. D’Aspremont et al. show
in turn that with quadratic transportation costs an equilibrium exists2. In
this modified setting, the firms locate at the extreme points of the mar-
ket and differentiation is maximal. Many authors have subsequently found
mitigated results about differentiation in equilibrium (Economides, 1984;
Hinloopen and van Marrevijk, 1999, among others). In our model, we ob-
tain that differentiation is generically intermediate, and this does not depend
on the shape of costs.
1We refer here to the informative dimension of catalog. Indeed each firm produces only
one kind of product, and it is the information on that product and its price that matters
in the catalog. Recently, Monteiro and Page (2008) have used the term catalog to refer
to product line. They study equilibrium existence in a nonlinear pricing game.
2As pointed out by MacLeod (1985), this implies that the mass of indifferent consumers
is zero, which restores equilibrium existence in price, thanks to continuity of the payoffs.
Another direction to restore equilibrium existence is to allow for mixed strategy in price
(see Dasgupta and Maskin (1986a,b) for a general treatment and applications), which can
be interpreted as occurrence of sales (Osborne and Pitchik, 1987).
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While models of horizontal differentiation have been the subject of a
vast literature, we focus on a topic that has not received enough attention:
the sequentiality of product and price choices (see Prescott and Visscher
(1977) for an early contribution). In most of the related literature, it is
usually assumed that firms choose location first (possibly sequentially as in
Tabuchi and Thisse (1995)) once and for all, then compete simultaneously in
price (Neven, 1987; Lambertini, 2002; Go¨tz, 2005; Economides et al., 2002).
This is consistent with the view that the location is a geographical parame-
ter, or with the view that the design of the product is far less flexible than
its price. As far as we know, only few papers modify the assumption of
last stage simultaneous price competition. Anderson (1987) studies a price
leadership configuration: the firms choose sequentially the locations, then
a Stackelberg competition in price takes place. His aim is to determine
which firm chooses to be the price leader, the answer is that the second
entrant is induced to be price leader, given the location chosen by the first
entrant. Lambertini (1997) compare different timing and underlines the fact
firms should play simultaneously in locations and sequentially in prices in
an unconstrained Hotelling model with quadratic costs.
In this paper, we investigate situations where location and prices are
necessarily chosen together. The first result concerning this ”catalog” com-
petition is that in general there does not exist an equilibrium in pure strate-
gies when competition is simultaneous. However, in a sequential catalog
competition, we are able to obtain the existence of subgame perfect equi-
libria with strictly positive profits for both firms under some assumptions.
Contrary to traditional entry models, it is the follower that decides whether
to exclude the incumbent or to accommodate, since only the follower firm
has the ability to undercut its rival. The subgame perfect equilibrium is
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such that the leader (incumbent) always earns less than the follower3. This
introduces a tension between the temptation of attrition - waiting to be the
follower, which leads to an unstable configuration, and the will to guarantee
a strictly positive profit.
Section 1 introduces the model and its assumptions. Section 2 gives the
main insights concerning the general model and characterizes sequential cat-
alog competition when a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium exists.
We solve then the cases in which costs are linear (as in Hotelling’s original
model) and in which costs are quadratic. We also study the catalog compe-
tition in the circular model of Salop (1979). Section 3 contains a discussion
of the model about sequentiality assumptions, examples are given where the
results seem to have some predictive power. The concluding section sums
up the results.
2 The model
We study a market where a mass 1 of consumers is distributed along the unit
interval according to the density function f . A product choice corresponds
to a point x ∈ [0, 1], the ideal product of the consumer located at x. We
are interested in competition through catalog in the following sense: each
firm chooses once and for all a product in [0, 1] and a price in R+. Firm A
chooses (a, p) and firm B chooses (b, q). For convenience, we choose a and b
as the distance of firms to zero4.
A consumer x chooses to purchase a product according to the utility
3Note that if the incumbent is a chain store, this may be true at the local level, but
overall, the chain store probably obtains a higher total profit (the sum over local retailers
or franchisees) than a single local competitor.
4Note that in Hotelling (1929), b is the distance of product B to 1.
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maximization: Max {v − C(x − a) − p, v − C(b − x) − q, 0}. The reserva-
tion price is v and a consumer buys a product only if the perceived price
is less than his reservation price. The cost function C is even, strictly
increasing on the right of 0, convex and twice continuously differentiable
(except maybe at zero, where it admits a left and a right derivative). In
Hotelling’s original model, the cost function is simply the distance and con-
sumers always consume the good, so that they minimize their disutility Min
(C(x− a) + p,C(b− x) + q). We mainly focus on the case in which v is
infinite. With or without a reservation price, consumer x prefers firm B
whenever C(x− a) + p ≥ C(b− x) + q. We define the indifferent consumer,
when unique, as y such that p+ C(a− y) = q + C(b− y).
When a consumer is indifferent between firm A and B, we assume that
it chooses the closest firm. Wherever this last criterion does not break
indifference (when the distances to each firm are equal), we assume that
some consumers choose A while others choose B. Formally, there exists some
predetermined λ with 0 < λ < 1 such that firm A gets a share λ and firm
B a share (1 − λ) of those indifferent consumers. We first study the game
where firms choose their catalog simultaneously, second we assume that firm
A is a catalog leader. In this second setting, firm A first chooses its strategy
(a, p), then firm B chooses (b, q) after having observed A’s moves. Hence, we
look for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the perfect information extensive
game depicted in figure 1.
We may remark that if firm B chooses the same location as firm A, then
its best response must be such that q ≤ p otherwise it gets no customer.
In turn, by setting a slightly smaller price than firm A, firm B obtains the
whole market. Thus if both firms choose the same location in equilibrium
before choosing their price simultaneously, prices will be driven down to zero,
6
Firm A
location a
price p
Firm B
location b
price q
Sales realized
Figure 1: Sequential setting
following the logic of Bertrand competition. As pointed out by Anderson
(1987, p. 379), Hotelling seems not to have well taken into account these
”undercutting” strategies. In the sequential setting, as the first firm posts
a price before the other enters, it cannot use such an undercutting strat-
egy. On the contrary, firm B has a powerful threat with these undercutting
strategies. The question is thus whether the leader can induce the follower
not to undercut, thereby securing a positive profit.
2.1 General results
Combining the results of Hotelling and d’Aspremont et al., one gets the
insights of the following result concerning catalog competition:
Proposition 1 For any distribution of the consumers’, any convex cost
function and an infinite willingness to pay, simultaneous catalog competi-
tion has no equilibrium in pure strategies.
A direct proof is rather intuitive5. First we notice that whatever the
other firm’s strategy, a firm can always get a strictly positive profit. Second,
we remark that there cannot be an equilibrium where both firms choose the
same product because then prices would be driven to zero. Let us therefore
5The results of Economides (1987) apply to the present setting, and we only sketch
here the intuitions.
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assume that one firm is pricing less than the other. This firm has an incentive
to choose the same product as its competitor, but then the other firm would
make zero profit, thus it cannot be an equilibrium. The same argument
holds when firms use the same price (except that firm will price slightly less
than its competitor). Thus there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
when v is infinite. However it is obvious that if v is small, there are Nash
equilibria as firms can enjoy local monopoly. This continues to hold for
small enough v, in which case firms compete for some customers, but there
is some finite level of v beyond which pure strategy equilibrium does not
exist any more6.
We now study the extensive game with sequential catalog issuing. We are
able to state the following observation.
Proposition 2 For any distribution of the consumers’, any cost function
and any willingness to pay, the follower makes a (weakly) higher profit than
the leader in any equilibrium of the sequential catalog competition.
This proposition is proved in appendix. It is of course straightforward if
the leader cannot prevent undercutting7, since the leader makes then zero
profit. This proposition shows that there is always a second mover advantage
in this setting.8. In other words, the price followership effect is stronger than
the location leadership effect in our model. This statement departs from the
result in Anderson (1987). He studies the case in which firms sequentially
6In a related paper, we studied this point in details, see Fleckinger and Lafay (2003).
7For example, when the distribution boils down to a single atom, Bertand competition
for this atom obtains, and there is a continuum of equilibria in which the leader makes
zero profit.
8For a full analysis of first versus second mover advantage in the case of unidimensional
strategies, see Gal-Or (1985).
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choose their location before sequentially choosing their prices. With that
different timing structure he shows that a leader in location and price earns
more than its follower.
This proposition also underlines that even when there exists an equi-
librium in simultaneous catalog competition (which requires a finite v as
already mentioned), both firms are better off with sequential catalog compe-
tition. Indeed, the leader can always get as much profit as in the simultane-
ous game by choosing the equilibrium product and price of the simultaneous
game. Formally, let ΠS be the largest profit among the simultaneous Nash
equilibria in pure strategies9 then ΠB ≥ ΠA ≥ ΠS . However, even if both
firms earn more in the sequential setting, they both prefer to be the follower.
In other words, they can agree to play a catalog competition sequentially
but none wants to publish its catalog first, creating an attrition temptation.
From now on, feminine pronouns will refer to the leader and masculine
ones to the follower. For a better understanding of the general shape of
equilibrium (when it exists), a classification of the follower’s strategies is in
order. In a sequential catalog competition, he has two kinds of strategies.
Either he chooses an exclusion strategy, which means that he sets a catalog
such that he serves the whole market. Or he chooses an accommodation
strategy such that the leader keeps a strictly positive market share. Among
the possible exclusion strategies, the best one is clearly to choose the same
product as the leader but with a slightly lower price, p − ǫ, with ǫ as small
as desired. In order to secure a positive market share, the leader must thus
guarantee a profit at least equal to p to the follower when using an accom-
modation strategy. We may note that contrary to the classical literature
9When they exist.
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about entry, in a catalog competition it is the follower who chooses between
accommodation and exclusion.
Consider the point of view of the follower, for a given strategy of the
leader (a, p), with a < 12 as it is pictured in Figure 2. The case a ≥ 12 hap-
pens to be similar, with symmetric considerations each time. For any price
q < p, i.e. in zones I and IV, it is clear that the best reply is to undercut the
leader, by setting b = a and q = p− ǫ. Any location in zone II is dominated
by the point in zone III such that the location is symmetric with respect to
a, keeping the same price, because then the market share is strictly bigger.
It also holds for any catalog (b, q) in II’ such that the follower has a positive
market share. The cases where the follower has zero market shares is obvi-
ously uninteresting. Overall, to find the best-reply of the follower, we can
restrict our attention on one hand to the subspace where b ≥ a and q > p
(accommodation), and on the other hand to the best undercutting strategy
(exclusion).
Now, in zone III and III’, for any price q, the follower is better off choos-
ing a catalog along the perceived price curve of the leader (x,C (a− x) + p)
, because it maximizes his market share. To see this, just notice that by
definition of y, the market share of the follower is the mass of consumers to
the right of y. Thus, for a constant price q, the goal of the follower is to
minimize y. This is formally expressed in the next lemma which is proved
in appendix.
Lemma 1 For any distribution of the consumers’, any cost function and
any willingness to pay, the follower chooses a catalog such that y = b and
q > p in an equilibrium with accommodation.
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C(a− x) + p
0 a
p
1
I
II
II’
III
III’
IV
Consumers
disutility
Figure 2: Strategies for the follower
Here the first mover is also the ’leader’ in price (as she posts the lowest
price). Indeed, the leader defines a price schedule and the follower uses this
price umbrella to fix its price. It also departs from Bertrand competition
where the follower in time is the leader in price.
We now investigate equilibrium existence. The main difficulty is related
to continuity. First, even the existence results of Dasgupta and Maskin
(1986a,b) for mixed strategy equilibrium do not apply because of a lack
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of upper hemi-continuity of the follower profit function10. Second, even
though we now know that the follower chooses a catalog (b, q) such that the
indifferent consumer is b, the best-reply b∗(a, p) may be a multivalued cor-
respondence11. Classically, this non uniqueness of best reply would imply
a multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibria depending on the anticipation
made by the leader regarding the way the follower will react. Third, the
profit of firm A may not be a continuous function of (a, p)12. To rule out
these situations, we impose the following sufficient condition for uniqueness
of the best reply of firm B.
Condition 1 C ′′(x) < 2C ′(x) for all x > 0.
This condition imposes an upper bound on the relative curvature of the
cost function. We are now in position to state the central result of this
section.
Proposition 3 With uniform consumers’ distribution and, under condition
1, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium in a sequential catalog compe-
tition such that the leader makes a positive profit.
10For example the function ΠB is such that lim
q→p
q<p
ΠB(a, q) = p > (1−λ)p = ΠB(a, p). To
overcome this issue, one can think of setting λ = 0 but it would only shift the continuity
problem to the leader’s optimization.
11For example, consider the following convex, twice differentiable function:
C(x) =


x
1−x
if x ≤ 1
2
8x2 − 4x+ 1 otherwise
. For a = 0 and p = 1 the accommodation best reply
is not uniquely defined as any b ∈ [0, 1
2
] (associated with the corresponding q = 1+C(b))
gives the same profit to the follower.
12Consider again the example of footnote 11, and fix a = 0. For p < 1, the follower’s
best reply is some b ≥ 1
2
, for p = 1, there is a continuum of best-replies, for p > 1, exclusion
is the unique best-reply. Therefore the profit of firm A is not continuous at (a, p) = (0, 1).
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The proof proceeds in four steps, and the sketch is as follows. First,
we obtain the best reply of the follower if he uses an accommodation strat-
egy. The leader has to choose her catalog in order to prevent an exclusion
strategy. In turn, this implies that p must be bounded. Finally, the leader
maximizes a continuous function over a compact, which guarantees the exis-
tence of a solution. Of course, there might be equilibria even when condition
1 is not fulfilled as we will show: the quadratic model possesses a subgame
perfect equilibrium obtained by backward induction.
2.2 Linear cost (a` la Hotelling)
Following Hotelling’s original assumption, we consider linear costs: C(x) =
t|x|, and look for the subgame perfect equilibrium of sequential catalog com-
petition. Note that the conditions for equilibrium existence of proposition
2 are met. Hence, we follow the lines of the preceding proof to obtain the
equilibrium. The optimal limit strategy of firm B if he decides to exclude
the leader is such that
(
bEx, qEx
)
= (a, p), implying ΠExB (a, p) = p. As the
problem is symmetric regarding locations we compute the equilibrium such
that a ≤ 12 .
We begin by computing firm B’s best reply if he decides to accommodate.
From lemma 1, the optimal accommodation strategy is such that q = p +
t(b − a). Therefore, firm B maximizes ΠAcB = (p+ t(b− a)) (1 − b) s.t.
0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ 1 and p ≥ 0, q ≥ 0 (these constraints, that define the valid
domain, are omitted in the following). This profit is a concave function,
and the first order condition implies:
(
bAc, qAc
)
=
(
1+a−p/t
2 ,
1−a+p/t
2
)
. The
solution has to be interior under the exclusion constraint ΠExB ≤ ΠAcB since
ΠAcB (b = 1) = 0 and Π
Ac
B (b = a) < Π
Ex
B . Substituting the interior solution,
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we obtain ΠAcB (a, p) =
(1−a+p/t)2
4 and Π
Ac
A (a, p) =
1+a−p/t
2 p/t. Firm A seeks
to maximize ΠAcA (a, p) under the constraint Π
Ac
B (a, p) =
(1−a+p/t)2
4 ≥ p.
For any p, ΠAcA is increasing while Π
Ac
B is decreasing in a, thus the con-
straint must be binding. Substituting in the objective function, A’s program
boils down to maximizing pt
(
1−
√
p
t
)
for p > 0. The value of the equilib-
rium parameters are in turn fully determined by using binding constraint
and the expression of the best-reply. This allows us to state:
Proposition 4 The subgame perfect equilibrium of the linear cost game is
such that (up to geometrical symmetry):
(a∗, p∗, b∗, q∗) =
(
1
9
,
4t
9
,
1
3
,
2t
3
)
Π∗A =
4t
27
and Π∗B =
4t
9
We may notice that the distance between the firms is such that no equi-
librium with competitive price exists. It violates the existence condition
given by d’Aspremont et al. (1979). In other words, if the firms were able to
revise (only) their prices, profits would be driven to zero by a price war. A
price commitment of the leader is therefore valuable for both firms, because
it allows to avoid an unstable configuration leading to zero profits. The
locations and prices at equilibrium are depicted in figure 3. Of course the
symmetric equilibrium (a∗, p∗, b∗, q∗) =
(
8
9 ,
4t
9 ,
2
3 ,
2t
3
)
is also possible.
2.3 Quadratic cost (a` la d’Aspremont et al.)
In the quadratic cost case, if firms first choose locations (either sequen-
tially or simultaneously) prior to prices, there is maximal differentiation
(d’Aspremont et al., 1979). Firms price at t and profits are then t/2.
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p∗ = 49
q∗ = 23
0 1a∗ = 19 b
∗ = 13
Π∗A =
4
27
Π∗B =
4
9
Consumers
disutility
Figure 3: Equilibrium with linear costs for t = 1
With quadratic costs, condition (1) of section 2 is not satisfied, and we can-
not apply proposition 2 to claim existence of an equilibrium. However, we
demonstrate in appendix that an equilibrium still exists by constructing it,
and obtain:
Proposition 5 The subgame perfect equilibrium of the catalog competition
in the quadratic cost game is such that (up to geometrical symmetry):
(a∗, p∗, b∗, q∗) =
(
0,
t
4
,
1
2
,
t
2
)
Π∗A =
t
8
and Π∗B =
t
4
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p∗ = 14
q∗ = 12
a∗ = 0 1b∗ = 12
Π∗A =
1
8
Π∗B =
1
4
Consumers
disutility
Figure 4: Equilibrium with quadratic costs for t = 1
Thus, differentiation is more important with quadratic costs than lin-
ear ones. The leader chooses a niche, while the follower chooses a generic
product. The locations and prices at equilibrium are depicted in figure 4.
2.4 Catalog competition in Salop’s model
We investigate here how the catalog competition operates on a circular mar-
ket such as Salop (1979). There is a unit mass of consumers uniformly
distributed along a circle. Indeed, it is easy to show that simultaneous cat-
alog competition exhibits no equilibrium in pure strategies. The sequential
catalog competition is such that the follower earns more than the leader
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and prices higher. However, contrary to Hotelling’s model, in Salop’s model
there exists an equilibrium if both firms choose first a location (either si-
multaneously or sequentially13) then compete simultaneously in price. This
equilibrium is such that firms choose opposite locations and price at t, so
that their profits are t/2. The question arises whether a sequential cata-
log competition is likely to appear. In order to answer this question, we
investigate the equilibrium when costs are linear.
It is clear that either the follower excludes the leader by choosing the
same location and pricing at p − ǫ, or he accommodates with an opposite
kind of product. There is thus maximal differentiation in any equilibrium
where the leader makes a strictly positive profit. In this case, the circular
market can be seen as two separate linear markets with firms located at the
extreme points. The indifferent consumer is such that: p+ ty = q+ t(1−y),
and thus y = q−p+t2t . Moreover it should be the case that y > 0 if the leader
makes a profit, thus one should have: p < q + t.
The follower maximizes q(1 − y) = q t+p−q2t . The first order condition
implies: q = p+t2 , and consequently ΠB =
(p+t)2
8t .
Firm A maximizes p3t−p4t under the constraints p < 3t (positive market
share) and p ≤ (p+t)28t (the follower prefers accommodation to exclusion).
The second constraint is the binding one and we obtain the equilibrium
values p =
(
3− 2√2) t and q = (2−√2) t. Profits are: ΠA =
(
3
√
2
2 − 2
)
t
and ΠB =
√
2ΠA.
We may notice that whereas there is still maximal differentiation, prices
are lower with catalog competition than in the standard timing of Salop
13Let us point out that, as long as both firms locate at the opposite, any location couple
is possible. In addition the simultaneous choice of location exhibits a strong coordination
problem.
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(1979). In fact, in a linear city, the leader can use both price and product
characteristic to prevent exclusion - he can locate away from the center
of the market in addition to pricing low. In turn, there is no niche on a
circular market -the only way to discourage undercutting is to post a low
price. This implies that while locations are the same as in the two-stage
(locations, then prices) Nash equilibrium, the price of the leader is smaller.
Overall, in equilibrium, the leader is thus using a low price - high market
share (more than a half) strategy, while the follower is using a high price -
low quantity strategy.
3 Discussion
3.1 The relative flexibility of prices
A feature of the model that deserves attention concerns the relative flexibility
of location and price. While in a geographical interpretation, the location
choice is a long-term decision relatively to the price decision, one can think
of markets where both variables are equally flexible. The catering industry
provides a good example of this. The product lifetime is very short (one
day, if the cooks behave properly), and the choice of product can be a daily
decision for independent restaurants, making product choice and price choice
equally flexible. In contrast, for chains, uniform pricing and centralized
decisions imply more inertia. In other words, chains make their price public
by advertisement and national catalogs, while independent stores react to
these leaders. The converse is obviously not true: local competition by a
small competitor do not lead chains to revise their catalog. Going deeper
into this example, one can remark that the model also fits the observation
that most chain restaurants sell rather specialized products (like pizzas or
18
Tex-mex food14), at lower prices than small competitors.
Travel agencies on internet provide an illustration of the predicted results
in the quadratic costs case. Typically common travel agencies were rather
specialized in a niche (as in d’Aspremont et al. (1979)) such as a continent
destination or a category ranking of packages. Internet changed the market
positioning strategies of firms because the choice of product is more flexible
on internet. Indeed software routines can recombine a package bundling
hotels and flights almost instantly, and information technologies have at the
same time provided access to large databases of offers that companies use
dynamically to redesign products. Therefore firms seem now to compete in
a way comparable to our model. This may explain that differentiation has
been reduced and competition is fiercer, in the spirit of our results.
Of course, the conclusions would be affected when considering multi-
product firms. It would clearly be worth inquiring the full catalog com-
petition problem with product line differentiation (see Monteiro and Page
(2008) for the most recent contribution on that topic).
3.2 A business strategy interpretation
In our sequential setting we proved that the follower always prices higher
and locates exactly where the indifferent consumer is in equilibrium. On
linear market, the leader’s strategy appears therefore as a low price strat-
egy a low market share strategy. This type of strategies is described in
Gelman and Salop (1983). In their model, the strategic choices are also bi-
dimensional but instead of choosing a product/price couple firms choose a
capacity/price couple. Leaders choose a low capacity/price couple giving
14Hamburgers also are considered specialized food in Europe.
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rise to low market share. This is what Gelman and Salop (1983) call a ’judo
economics’ effect. In our model, leaders commit to be small and hence limit
the loss of market share due to competition by choosing a specific product
exactly as leaders would choose a low capacity in order to not threaten fu-
ture competition. Moreover they choose a low price in order to make its
market unattractive to competition and to limit the followers’ willingness to
exclude leaders.15
Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) call this behavior the ’puppy dog’ behav-
ior. In their analysis, firms also face a bi-dimensional competition involving
an investment choice followed by a strategic choice, such as a price. Here
the price decisions are strategic complements and a central location choice
appears as tough. The same conclusion therefore holds: the leader uses a
’puppy dog’ behavior by choosing a specific product and in order to protect
its own market it uses a low price strategy.
Interestingly, the equilibrium strategies in the circular setting are dif-
ferent. The leaders cannot anymore use the location strategy to pacify
competition: a specialized niche market does not exist. In other words, the
leader’s only means to appear soft would be to use a high price strategy.
But this strategy precisely makes undercutting at the same location very
attractive to the follower. Hence this induces leaders to be actually more
aggressive in prices, to make undercutting unprofitable. As a result, in the
circular market, the leader’s strategy is ’top dog’ behavior, as described in
Fudenberg and Tirole (1984).
15 Gelman and Salop (1983) note p.319 that the judo economics story could also hold
with differentiated products: choosing a specialty product is akin to choosing a low ca-
pacity according to them. We give a precise formal meaning to their claim.
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3.3 On sequential settings with linear costs
In models of horizontal differentiation, seven possible sequential settings
may be considered16. We already know that the (three) cases where firms
choose prices simultaneously have no equilibrium in pure strategies. Up to
our knowledge, Anderson (1987) is the closest paper about sequential prices
and differentiation. He studies the two cases (2 and 3 in figure 5) where
firms first sequentially choose their location and then sequentially choose
their prices with linear costs. He proves that the most likely situation is the
one with the location leader being subsequently the price follower (case 3).
The explanation is that the location leader can choose a product such that
the location follower prefers to be the price leader: the location leader then
locates at the center of the market.
The credibility of the equilibrium he favors might be questioned using
our timing structure. If the location follower decides to wait for the location
leader to post her price before choosing her product (which is our timing
structure), he makes a greater profit. Thus if, ex ante, the follower can
credibly commit to enter an attrition game until the leader posts a price,
then the location leader will post her price before the entry of the follower.
However, this attrition strategy is not credible per se: if the leader chooses
her strategy as in Anderson’s model (a = 0.5) then the follower has an
incentive to choose his product before the leader posts her price. Otherwise,
the location leader would have to post a tiny price in order to prevent
undercutting, which would spoil the market for both firms.
Hence, we can distinguish two cases. If the choice of product is irre-
16We do not consider unlikely cases in which firms choose their prices before the loca-
tions.
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(1)
Hotelling
(1929)
A
a
B
b
A,B
p, q Sales
(2)
Anderson I
(1987)
A
a
B
b
A
p
B
q Sales
(3)
Anderson II
(1987)
A
a
B
b, q
A
p Sales
(4)
This model
A
a, p
B
b, q Sales
Figure 5: Timing comparison
versible without fixing a price, then Anderson’s model is more relevant: the
leader chooses a generic product (a = .5), the follower chooses a specific
product (b = 0.869) and its price, the leader in price is the location fol-
lower; prices are relatively high (pA = 1.277, pB = 1.185) as well as profits
(ΠA = 0.815 and ΠB = 0.428). In this case, the leader is better off than the
follower. On the contrary, if the commitment of firms can only be a product-
price couple, or if firm B can credibly commit to enter the market only after
firm A chose its price, then our model is relevant. The follower has a second
mover advantage. The leader chooses a specific product (a = 1/9) with
a low price (pA = 0.444) in order to secure her market while the follower
thrives under the umbrella price of the leader while choosing a more generic
product (b = .333, pB = 0.667). The profits are then low (ΠA = 0.148 and
ΠB = 0.444). This catalog competition is fiercer than the Anderson’s one.
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Moreover, there is a value to commit to a product independently of a price
only for the leader.
4 Conclusion
We have investigated the existence and shape of equilibrium in pure strate-
gies when firms choose at the same time a location and a price in Hotelling’s
duopoly. There is no equilibrium in the simultaneous game, while when
firms successively choose their catalog there exist equilibria with positive
profits. An equilibrium is such that: 1) the follower always earns more than
the leader, whatever the distribution of consumers and the costs structure;
2) the follower charges a higher price than the leader: the leader in time is
the leader in price; 3) in both linear and quadratic cases, the leader makes
the follower indifferent between excluding him from the market and choosing
a location such that each firm has a fraction of the market; 4) Differentiation
is never minimal nor maximal in equilibrium, and this is qualitatively inde-
pendent of the costs’ shape; 5) The follower may end up with both higher
price and higher market shares than the leader.
In the linear cost case, a sequential catalog competition is likely to sta-
bilize the market (there is no pure strategy equilibrium otherwise), while
if costs are quadratic or when the market is circular, catalog competition
harms the firms. This might explain why on some markets firms mostly
communicate on the characteristics of their products but do not post prices.
Moreover, in the circular version of the model, the firms use opposite strate-
gies: one chooses a high volume strategy, and the other chooses a high price
strategy.
There exist many markets where the choice of product is flexible and
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where consumers get information only through advertisement and catalog,
and as such activities are costly, firms do not continuously undertake them.
This suggests that the dynamics of prices should also be analyzed in terms of
sequentiality of announces and heterogeneous reactive abilities in horizontal
differentiation models.
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of proposition 2:
We assume that consumers are spread over the market according to some
given density function f(x). We consider the case of a finite willingness to
pay v. The case of infinite willingness to pay is obtained in a similar (and
even simpler) way.
Assume that ΠB < ΠA in a subgame perfect equilibrium, denote the
corresponding strategies by (a∗, p∗) and (b∗, q∗) and set ∆ = ΠA −ΠB > 0.
We show that firm B is better off by choosing catalog (a∗, p∗ − ǫ).
Let S be the set of consumers served by firm A in such an equilibrium:
S = {x|v − C(x, a∗)− p∗ ≥ 0 and C(x, a∗) + p∗ ≤ C(x, b∗) + q∗}
and let µ be its weight: µ =
∫
S f(x)dx. By definition of S, ΠA = p
∗µ.
Let S′ be the set of consumers served by firm A if firm B was not here:
S′ = {x|v − C(x, a∗)− p∗ ≥ 0} ⊃ S
For any ǫ > 0, by setting (b, q) = (a∗, p∗ − ǫ), firm B clearly attracts all
consumers in S′. Since S ⊂ S′, he gets then a profit at least equal to
(p − ǫ)µ = ΠA − ǫµ. For ǫ < ∆µ , (p − ǫ)µ > ΠA −∆ = ΠB . This contradict
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the fact that (b∗, q∗) is an equilibrium strategy. Thus in any equilibrium one
has necessarily ΠB ≥ ΠA.
A.2 Proof of lemma 1
There remains to consider zones III and III’ of figure 2. The follower wants
to minimize y because its market share consists of the clients to the right
of y. By definition, y is implicitly given by: p + C(y − a) = q + C(b − y),
for all b such that the solution is in [0, 1]. If such y does not exist, then
the follower has no market share (recall q ≥ p in these zones), and we can
discard this strictly dominated case. Differentiating the implicit definition
of y with respect to b, we have:
[
C ′(y − a) + C ′(b− y)] ∂y
∂b
= C ′(b− y)
. In zone III, one has a ≤ y ≤ b. Thus C ′(y − a) + C ′(b − y) ≥ 0 and
C ′(b− y) ≥ 0, therefore y is increasing in b, and the follower wants to set b
as small as possible.
In zone III’, one has a ≤ b ≤ y, thus y − a ≥ y − b. Then by convexity of
C, C ′(y − a) + C ′(b− y) ≥ 0. Since b− y ≤ 0, C ′(b− y) ≤ 0, and overall y
is thus decreasing in b. Therefore in zone III’ the follower wants to set b as
large as possible.
Since y is continuous in b, we can conclude that it must be the case that
b = y at an optimal accommodation strategy. Finally, q = p+C(b− a) > p
by substituting in the definition of y.
A.3 Proof of proposition 3:
From lemma 1, we can restrict attention to y = b for accommodation, so
that q = p + C(b− a). By symmetry, we assume without loss of generality
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that 0 ≤ a ≤ 12 , and clearly a ≤ b. We consider a uniform distribution of
consumers, i.e. f(x) = 1 for all x.
We study the game backwards: the first three steps analyze the follower’s
program and the last step concerns the leader’s optimization. The accom-
modation profit of the follower is:
ΠAcB = q(1− y) = [p+ C(b− a)] (1− b)
The first and second order conditions are:
(FOC) p+ C(b− a) = (1− b)C ′(b− a)
(SOC) (1− b)C ′′(b− a)− 2C ′(b− a) ≤ 0
Step 1: Uniqueness of the interior solution in case of existence.
From condition 1, the SOC is always satisfied. Moreover, the accommoda-
tion profit is strictly concave for b 6= a. Therefore, for any catalog of the
leader, there is at most one b that satisfies the first-order condition.
Step 2: Boundedness of p at an interior solution.
Now we need to check that the optimal p is necessarily finite when there
is an interior solution (otherwise it could be the case that there does not
exist a best strategy of the leader). We know that a best accommodation
strategy necessarily satisfies (FOC), thus
p ≤ p+ C(b− a) = (1− b)C ′(b− a) ≤ C ′(1)
. Necessarily p ≤ C ′(1) for accommodation.
Step 3: The exclusion constraint implies the existence of an interior
solution.
We want to show that when the leader prevent exclusion, then necessarily
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there exists some bAc a strict interior solution to the follower maximization.
By excluding the leader, the follower can get a profit as close as desired to
p. So in order to prevent exclusion, the leader must choose a catalog such
that the accommodation strategy yields a profit greater than or equal to p:
[p+ C(b− a)] (1− b) ≥ p
for at least one b along the accommodation curve defined in lemma 2. If there
does not exist an interior solution then the best accommodation strategy is
such that either b is equal to 1 which yields to zero profit or b is equal to a.
Thus the accommodation profit is (1−λ)p, which is lower than the exclusion
profit since exclusion yields as close as desired to p. Therefore, under the
exclusion constraint, there exists a strictly interior optimal accommodation
strategy. We know that this accommodation strategy is unique from step 2.
Step 4: The Leader’s optimization.
We have seen in step 2 that the corresponding domain is bounded since it is
included in [0, 1]× [0, C ′(1)]. Step 3 tells us that, on this domain and under
the exclusion constraint, an interior accommodation strategy always exists
and is uniquely defined as a function of (a, p). The program can thus be
stated as:
max
a,p
ΠAcA = pb
Ac(a, p)
under the constraints:
bAc(a, p) = Arg max
a≤b≤1
{ΠAcB (b, a, p) = (1− b)(p + C(b− a))}
(1− bAc(a, p))(p + C(bAc(a, p)− a)) ≥ p
0 ≤ a ≤ 1
2
0 ≤ p ≤ C ′(1)
The function ΠAcB is a differentiable function of (b, a, p). We have seen that
under the exclusion constraint there exists a unique interior solution for the
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maximum problem for all (a, p) thus bAc(a, p) is continuous. Thus ΠAcA is
a continuous function. The domain is non empty: consider for example
a = 0 and 0 < p < C(12), then the follower prefers b =
1
2 to exclusion
because p < 12 (p + C(
1
2)) = Π
Ac
B . This shows that on this domain the
leader obtains strictly positive profits. The constraints are not strict and
the domain is bounded thus it is a non-empty compact. This ensures that the
leader’s program has a solution. Therefore, there exists a subgame perfect
equilibrium to the sequential catalog game with a strictly positive profit for
both firms.
A.4 Proof of proposition 5:
The proof follows the lines of proposition 3, although condition 1 does not
apply. The indifferent consumer y is such that p+ t(y− a)2 = q+ t(y− b)2.
There is a unique solution such that y ∈ [a, b]. Moreover, we know that the
best reply of the follower must be such that y = b, thus q = p+ t(b− a)2.
We first characterize the best accommodation strategy. The follower’s ac-
commodation program is:
(PAc) max
q,b
q(1− b) = max
b∈[a,1]
(
p+ t(b− a)2) (1− b)
When the solution of (PAc) is not interior, this means that the follower
uses an exclusion strategy. Indeed, a corner solution is either b = 1 but then
this would mean zero profit for the follower, and it is therefore impossible,
or b = a and q = p, but this is dominated for the follower by exclusion, with
b = a and q = p − ǫ for ǫ smaller than λ. Thus the leader should act such
that the solution of (PAc) is interior to make a profit.
First order condition implies: −3b2+ b(4a+2)− p/t− a2− 2a = 0. The
discriminant is ∆ = 4
[
(a− 1)2 − 3p/t], so the leader must use a strategy
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such that p ≤ t (a−1)23 in order not to be excluded by the follower.
We have two solutions in b, and the second order condition is 2(2a+1−
3b): The only maximum is b∗(a, p) = 13
[
1 + 2a+
√
(a− 1)2 − 3p/t
]
.
However, the leader must still guarantee a profit of p to the follower in
order to prevent an exclusion strategy.
The leader maximizes: max
a,p
pb∗(a, p) = p1+2a+
√
(a−1)2−3p/t
3 under the
constraint that the follower accommodates: pb ≤ t(b− a)2(1− b)
Let us ignore the other constraints (0 ≤ a ≤ 12 and a ≤ b ≤ 1) and check
them at the end. Maximizing first in a and then in p yields:
∂ΠA
∂a =
p
3t
[
2 + a−1√
(a−1)2−3p/t
]
and ∂
2ΠA
∂a2
= p3t
[
−3p/t
[(a−1)2−3p/t]3/2
]
< 0
Maximization implies a = 1− 2
√
p/t. As a has to be positive, it implies
that p must be inferior to t/4.
Either p ≤ t/4 and a∗ = 1− 2
√
p/t or p > t/4 and a∗ = 0. But if a = 0
then the constraint pb ≤ t(b − a)2(1 − b) implies p ≤ t/4. Thus the leader
has to choose a strategy such that p ≤ t/4.
Let us now consider the leader’s program: max
0≤p≤ t
4
ΠA = p− p
3/2√
t
. On the
admissible domain we have ∂ΠA∂p = 1− 32
√
p/t > 0.
Finally, we obtain p∗ = t4 and a
∗ = 0 and the optimal strategy of the
follower is: (b∗, q∗) =
(
1
2 ,
t
2
)
, this solution respects all the constraints.
References
Anderson, S., 1987. Spatial competition and price leadership. International
Journal of Industrial Organization 5, 369-398. 4, 7, 8, 21
Dasgupta, P., Maskin, E., 1986. The existence of equilibrium in discon-
29
tinuous economic games I: theory; II: applications. Review of Economic
Studies 53, 1-41. 3, 11
D’Aspremont, C., Gabszewicz, J., Thisse, J.F., 1979. On Hotelling’s ’Stabil-
ity in Competition’. Econometrica 47, 1145-1150. 3, 14, 19
Economides, N., 1984. The Principle of minimum differentiation revisited.
European Economic Review 24, 345-368. 3
Economides, N., 1987. On Nash Equilibrium existence and optimality in
Oligopolistic Competition in Prices and Varieties. Greek Economic Review
9, 198-209. 7
Economides, N., Howell, J., Meza, S., 2002. Does it Pay to be the First? Se-
quential Locational Choice and Foreclosure. Working paper, Stern School
of Business, New York University. 4
Fleckinger, P., Lafay, T., 2003. Horizontal Differentiation and Price Com-
petition with Sequential Entry, Working paper 2003-23, CECO, Ecole
Polytechnique. 8
Fudenberg, D., Tirole, J., 1984. The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy,
and the Lean and Hungry Look, American Economic Review 74, 361 - 66.
20
Gal-Or, E., 1985, First Mover and Second Mover Advantages, International
Economic Review, 26, No. 3, 649-653. 8
Gelman, J., Salop, S., 1983. Judo Economics: Capacity Limitation and
Coupon Competition, Bell Journal of Economics 14, 315-325. 19, 20
30
Go¨tz, G., 2005. Endogenous sequential entry in a spatial model revisited.
International Journal of Industrial Organization 23, 249-261. 4
Hinloopen, J., van Marrevijk, C., 1999. On the limits and possibilities of the
principle of minimum differentiation. International Journal of Industrial
Organization 17, 735-750. 3
Hotelling, H., 1929. Stability in competition. Economic Journal 39, 41-57. 5
Lambertini, L., 1997. Unicity of equilibrium in the unconstrained Hotelling
model. Regional Science and Urban Economics 27, 785-798. 4
Lambertini, L., 2002. Equilibrium locations in a spatial model with sequen-
tial entry in real time. Regional Science and Urban Economics 32, 47-58.
4
MacLeod, W. B., 1985. On the non-existence of equilibria in differentiated
product models. Regional Science and Urban Economics 15, 245-262. 3
Monteiro, P.K., Page, F.H., 2008. Catalog competition and Nash equilibrium
in nonlinear pricing games. Economic Theory 34, 503-524. 3, 19
Neven, D.J., 1987. Endogenous sequential entry in a spatial model. Interna-
tional Journal of Industrial Organization 5, 419-434. 4
Osborne, M., Pitchik, C., 1987. Equilibrium in Hotelling’s Model of Spatial
Competition. Econometrica 55, 911-22. 3
Prescott, E.C., Visscher, M., 1977. Sequential location among firms with
foresight. Bell Journal of Economics 8, 378-393. 4
Salop, S.C., 1979. Monopolostic Competition with Outside Goods. Bell Jour-
nal of Economics 10, 141-156. 5, 16, 17
31
Tabuchi, T., Thisse, J.F., 1995. Asymmetric equilibria in spatial competi-
tion. International Journal of Industrial Organization 13, 213-227. 4
32
